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Abstract
Adversarial examples have shown that albeit highly accu-
rate, models learned by machines, differently from humans,
have many weaknesses. However, humans’ perception is
also fundamentally different from machines, because we do
not see the signals which arrive at the retina but a rather
complex recreation of them. In this paper, we explore how
machines could recreate the input as well as investigate the
benefits of such an augmented perception. In this regard, we
propose Perceptual Deep Neural Networks (ϕDNN) which
also recreate their own input before further processing. The
concept is formalized mathematically and two variations
of it are developed (one based on inpainting the whole im-
age and the other based on a noisy resized super resolution
recreation). Experiments reveal that ϕDNNs can reduce
attacks’ accuracy substantially, surpassing even state-of-the-
art defenses. Moreover, the recreation process intentionally
corrupts the input image. Interestingly, we show by ablation
tests that corrupting the input is, although counter-intuitive,
beneficial. This suggests that the blind-spot in vertebrates
might also be, analogously, the precursor of visual robust-
ness. Thus, ϕDNNs reveal that input recreation has strong
benefits for artificial neural networks similar to biological
ones, shedding light into the importance of the blind-spot
and starting an area of perception models for robust recog-
nition in artificial intelligence.
1. Introduction
Recent work has revealed that albeit highly accurate, deep
neural networks are far from robust [34]. The lack of robust-
ness exist even for extremely small perturbations and simple
transformations [23, 10, 33]. A wide range of defenses were
proposed in recent years [12, 13, 21, 25, 22]. However, most
of them have shortcomings such as relying on obfuscated
gradients [1] or being biased by the type of perturbation used
to train (e.g., adversarial training) [19, 17].
Humans are less affected by small changes in the input.
Figure 1: Illustration of the proposed ϕDNN architecture
and its similarity to the filling-in phenomena in human vi-
sion. Input x is initially corrupted by δ(x), removing some
information while keeping contextual clues. One or multiple
p(δ(x); θ) uses this corrupted image to predict a partial re-
construction which is then aggregated with function µ and
sent to the vanilla classifier.
Interestingly, this is true even when part of the input is com-
pletely removed; which happens every second. Each of our
eyes have a blind spot1 where light cannot be perceived. Al-
beit this limitation, when we close one eye we do not see
a black spot but a completely filled perception of an image
[7, 18]. This is an example of how the brain is always predict-
ing what it is viewing, revealing that biological perceptual
systems are active rather than passive [24]. Thus, the images
we see every second is rather a creation than mere signals
that arrived in the brain, also called perception filling-in and
related to predictive coding [5, 29, 9].
Could deep neural networks also benefit
from actively creating its own input?
To answer the question above we developed two percep-
tual systems that recreate the input image with predictions
1The blind spot in each eye is where the optic nerve passes through the
optic disc and therefore no photoreceptor cells are present.
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of it. One is based on inpainting all parts of the image
(Section 3.2) while the other is based on recreating a super
resolution of the image and then resizing it (Section 3.2).
The recreated input is then fed to a deep neural network
which has no access to the original input (Figure 1). Attacks
on both systems suggest that by recreating the input robust-
ness against adversarial attacks increase. Furthermore, the
input recreation is not mutually exclusive with many of the
previous defenses. It can be used together with adversarial
training, for example, to improve further robustness.
Our contributions. In this paper, we present input
recreation as a novel paradigm to enhance robustness against
adversarial samples. The key contributions can be summa-
rized as follows:
• We introduce deep neural networks (DNN) that create
their own input based solely on contextual hints from
the input, called perceptual DNNs (ϕDNN). We de-
scribe ϕDNNs formally and conduct experiments on
two different implementations of it.
• We propose an inpainting based ϕDNN. It works by
predicting removed parts of the image and then join-
ing the predicted parts together in a single completely
recreated image. This recreated image is then used as
input to a DNN.
• We propose a super resolution based ϕDNN which
recreates a higher resolution version of the input exclud-
ing at the same time any noise present in the original
one. The image is later resized and inputted to a DNN.
• We conduct tests with white-box and black-box attacks
to evaluate the robustness against adversarial samples.
The results suggest that approaches with active per-
ceptual systems recreating their own input can achieve
higher robustness than their counterparts. This is true
not only for the best performing system but most of
its numerous variations, revealing a strength of the ap-
proach. Moreover, ϕDNNs can be used jointly with
other defenses for further increasing robustness.
• Results here suggests that the blind-spot in vertebrates
might also, analogously, induce both robustness and a
primitive form of imagination that recreates the input.
2. Related Works
Attack Methods. In this paper, we make use of attack
methods for the sole purpose of evaluating the robustness of
defenses and neural network models. Several attack models
have been proposed in recent studies. They can be broadly
categorized into white box [34, 12, 23, 3] and black box
attacks [26, 2, 16, 36, 8]. Many white box models can be
summarized as follows. Given a target classifier C and
a input pair (x, y). Let L be the adversarial loss for the
classifier C(x′) e.g., the cross-entropy loss, and the `p norm
used to measure the distance between the legitimate input
x and the adversarial input x′. Generally, white box attack
methods have been proposed by solving the constrained
optimization problem:
min
x′
L(C(x′), y), s.t. ‖ x− x′ ‖p≤ . (1)
Examples of white box attacks are FGSM, one of the earliest
white box attacks, which uses one-step approach to deter-
mine the direction to change the pixel value, [12] and an
improved method called projected gradient descent (PGD)
with a multiple-step variant [23]. In contrast, black box at-
tacks have been proposed under more critical and practical
conditions with the trade-offs of being slower. Here, we
are also interested in black box attacks which are not based
on estimating gradients and therefore can find adversarial
samples even when the gradient is masked [1]. Therefore,
tests with more straightforward black box attack methods
based on evolutionary strategy such as the one-pixel attack
and few-pixel attack fits the purpose [33].
Defenses to Adversarial Attacks. Recent studies have
proposed various defense mechanisms against the threat of
adversarial attacks. Albeit recent efforts, there is not yet
a completely effective method. Defensive distillation, for
example, proposed a smaller neural network which squeezed
the content learned by the original one [27], however, it was
shown to lack robustness in a later paper [3]. Adversarial
training which was firstly proposed by Goodfellow et al. [12]
increases the robustness by adding adversarial examples to
the training set [15], [23]. Similarly, adversarial training was
also shown vulnerable to attacks in [35]. Other defenses in-
clude pre-processing defenses such as the feature squeezing
(FS) and spatial smoothing (SS) [40]. The objective here is
to remove adversarial perturbation in a pre-processing stage.
Recently there are a huge number of defenses proposed, how-
ever, they use mostly variations of gradient masking to avoid
being attacked which do not confer greater security [1]. Re-
garding GAN based defenses, Defense-GAN [31] is based
on training a generative adversarial network (GAN) to learn
the distribution of original images. Each input would then be
used to search for the closest projected input image learned
by the generator before proceeding to classification. One of
the main shortcomings is that the distribution learned by the
generator is strictly limited by the training data set and the
input image might be mapped into an illegitimate space. Al-
beit using GANs in our proposed approach, it shares no other
similarities to Defense-GAN. Here, GANs predict parts of
the input using the contextual information present and after
the input has been severely corrupted by a simple function.
2
Predictive Coding. Although ϕDNNs do not necessar-
ily use many of the components of predictive coding, it is
loosely based on it. Predictive coding is a theory in neu-
roscience which demonstrates that the brain achieves high
visual robustness by dynamically updating and predicting
neural activities from the environment [28]. Previous stud-
ies have shown that the brain uses similar representations
with CNNs, but CNNs are not as robust as the brain [4, 39].
Though there is still no perfect theoretical explanation for
how it works, biological plausible models describe it as a
recurrently connected hierarchical neural networks [32]. Re-
cent research on predictive coding based CNNs imitating the
feedforward, feedback, and recurrent connections performed
well in object recognition [38].
This work makes use of both Generative Adversarial Net-
work (GAN) and Variational AutoEncoder (VAE) to recon-
struct the images. They are described briefly as follows.
2.1. Generative Adversarial Network
Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) is a powerful
generative model that consists of two neural networks: a
generator network which learns the probability distribution
of the input and a binary discriminator network which dis-
tinguishes between generated data and the input data. Good-
fellow et al. [11] originally introduced a GAN to solve the
following min-max loss function:
min
G
max
D
Ex∼pdata(x)[logD(x)]
+Ez∼pz(z) [log(1−D(G(z)))]. (2)
where pdata, pz represent the data distribution from the input
and the generator, max
D
maximizes the difference between
pdata and pz , while min
G
converges to minimum when pdata
equals pz .
Super-resolution GAN (SRGAN). Super-resolution
GAN (SRGAN) generates a photo-realistic high-resolution
(HR) image from its downsampled low-resolution (LR) in-
put image [20]. They used VGG-19 network to extract high
dimension features and designed an alternative function, the
perceptual loss function which consists of content loss and
adversarial loss, to solve the following optimization prob-
lem:
min
G
max
D
EIHR∼ptrain(IHR)[logD(I
HR)]
+EILR∼PG(ILR)[log(1−D(G(ILR)))]. (3)
Here, the generative model G maps a given LR input ILR
to its HR counterpart IHR. The discriminator D is trained
to distinguish between the produced IHR images from real
inputs.
2.2. Autoencoder based Inpainting
Inpainting is defined as the synthesis of content to fill
missing image parts. Here, we use an Autoencoder (AE)
to predict the missing pixels with a simple UNET-like ar-
chitecture [37, 30]. Let a masked image x0 be represented
as x0 = x  (1 −M), in which M is a binary mask, x is
the original input image and  is the element-wise product
operation. Inpainting can be formulated as the following
energy minimization problem:
min
θ
E(F (x0; θ);x),
E(F (x0; θ);x) = |(F (x0; θ)− x)|,
where F is the resulting function from the AE with parame-
ters θ.
3. ϕDNNs
In this section, we describe formally the ϕDNN architec-
ture, its motivation as well as two different implementations
of it.
3.1. The Technical Motivation Behind Input Recre-
ation
Beyond the bio-inspired aspect, there are some technical
importance for recreating the input in a similar way to hu-
mans and other animals. First, by recreating the input, the
neural network and not the environment defines which input
will be responsible for the output of the system. This type
of actively modified input provides further control of the
input to avoid contextual problems or other issues beyond
adversarial samples. Second, it is now possible to constrain
the probability distribution of the input further. This can be
done in many ways and is only slightly explored here with
added noise. Third, with perceptual changes happening all
the time, attacking becomes a time-varying function which
might be impossible to repeat. This would make calculated
attacks near impossible. Fourth, when facing ϕDNNs, the
attacker has less information about the network for he/she
does not know even the input now. Lastly, gradient-based
and gradient estimation based approached tend to perform
poorly if the input recreation is well designed.
3.2. ϕDNN’s Architecture
Consider the perceptual tupleϕ and its respective function
ϕ(x) as follows:
ϕ :=< δ, p(δ(x); θ), µ >, (4)
ϕ(x) = µ(p(δ(x); θ)), (5)
where δ is a function that corrupts the input, removing some
information from it and returning one or multiple images;
p(δ(x); θ) is the probability distribution learned by the per-
ceptual layer that predicts x from the corrupted input δ(x)
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based on its learned weights θ; and µ is the aggregation
function which corrects the output from the perceptual layer
to be the same as original input x.
ϕDNN is defined as follows:
ϕDNN := C(ϕ(x)), (6)
in which C is a classifier that receives as input the output
from the perceptual function ϕ(x).
Noisy Super-Resolution Reconstruction (NSR) Here
we define an implementation of the ϕDNN’s architecture
using super resolution and images corrupted with noise. Note
that images are always corrupted with noise. Let x be a given
input and R a function which resizes the high resolution
image to the original resolution. The process can be defined
as follows:
ϕr =< δr, pr(δ(x); θr), µr >, (7)
where δr = Noise, pr = G(δ(x); θ), µr = R.
note that Noise is an arbitrary noise function which returns
a noisy image. G(δ(x); θ) is the generator of SRGAN which
maps an image from low resolution to high resolution and
tries to clean the always present noise (illustrated in Fig-
ure 2).
Full Inpainting Reconstruction (FIR) To demon-
strate that ϕDNNs can be developed in many forms, here,
we propose a ϕDNN based on inpainting the whole image.
Specifically, ϕi is defined as follows.
ϕi =< δi, pi(δ(x); θi), µi >, (8)
where δi(x) =
9⋃
k=0
(1−Mk) · x,
pi = F (δ(x); θ), µi(x) =
9∑
k=0
Mk · x,
where Mk are masks such that their sum is equal to the
identity matrix (
∑9
k=0Mk = I) and their multiplication is
equal to 0 (
∏9
k=0Mk = 0). Therefore, each of the masks
hide a specific part of the image and together they mask
the whole image. δi(x) (i.e.,
⋃9
k=0(1−Mk) · x) creates
a set with 10 masked inputs. All masked inputs are then
inpainted with F (δ(x)); θ and lastly all inpainted parts are
joined together through
∑9
k=0Mk · x. Figure 2 shows an
illustration of the process.
4. Experiments
To evaluate ϕDNN architecture, we test here the robust-
ness of two implementations of it (i.e., FIR and NSR) by
attacking them with different types of attacks. The proposed
architecture is also compared with other defenses and we
explore the possibility of employing it together with other
defenses.
Settings. To evaluate the robustness of systems avoid-
ing biases and the sole presence of gradient masking, we
employ two white box attacks (FGSM and PGD) as well as
non-gradient based black box attacks (one pixel and ten pixel
attack). In this paper, every attack is repeated for 500 random
images of the test data set with the average attack accuracy
being reported. AllConv neural network is the main neural
network used for both FIR and NSR, although some tests
with different models are present. For all experiments, the
CIFAR-10 dataset is normalized to the range [0, 1]. The ma-
chines used in the experiments are equipped with NVIDIA
GeForce RTX 2080 Ti and AMD Ryzen 9 3950x 16-core.
The deep neural networks used by our proposed methods
after the ϕ(x) transformation are not augmented.
Regarding FIR, 10 masks are created, each of them re-
moving 10% of the image (Figure 3). To create the masks,
a grid of a given size is set over the 32×32 image and then
multiple pieces of this grid are randomly selected to form
one mask. Pieces are selected until 10% of the image is cov-
ered. The inpainting model is trained with a corresponding
mask size covering 10% of the image and with epochs and
batch size of respectively 20 and 32.
Regarding NSR, to create the training dataset for SRGAN
we resize CIFAR-10 dataset to 128×128 as the high resolu-
tion ground truth and add noise to the training dataset during
training. The type of noise used is bi-linear interpolation
for both up and downsizing. In order to match with the nor-
malization, we replace tanh with sigmoid as the activation
function for the last convolution layer in SRGAN’s generator.
We train SRGAN with 1000 epochs and set batch size to 20
to ensure convergence.
4.1. Comparison with other Defenses
Tables 1 and 2 compare the last development in adversar-
ial training, i.e. Feature Scaterring [41] , with the proposed
algorithms and variations of them trained with a simple ad-
versarial training. Results show that ϕDNNs with adversarial
training surpass FScattering for most (7 out of the 8 experi-
ments) of the widely different attacks tested. It is known that
adversarial training methods such as FScattering perform
poorly when the attacking distribution differ from the data
used to learn. This applies to FScattering as well which can
be attacked with nearly 60% with 10px attack. Having said
that, it is impressive that both NSR and FIR can surpass
FScattering even on FGSM and PGD which are close to the
augmented distribution of noisy images it used to learn. No-
tice that the same adversarial training that has little change
on the vanilla Resnet (i.e., ResNetadv) is very effective on
4
Figure 2: Illustration of the two implementations of ϕDNNs proposed: Noisy Super-Resolution Reconstruction based (top)
and Full Inpainting Reconstruction based (bottom).
Figure 3: Three masks created for FIR with grid size of
respectively (from left to right) 1, 4 and 8.
NSR and FIR. For example, PGD attack accuracy on FIRadv
is 86% lower than vanilla FIR. Thus, it is expected that if
a state-of-the-art adversarial training is applied to NSR and
FIR, their robustness should improve even further.
In fact, if we take into account that FScattering and
ϕDNN are (a) different in nature and (b) can be also used
together. It can be justified that ϕDNNs should be compared
with other pre-processing defenses and not adversarial train-
ing ones. We follow this rational and compare the proposed
methodology in Table 3 with other pre-processing defenses
such as FS, SS, JPEG compression defence (JPEG) [6] and
Label Smoothing (LS) [14]. Here all defenses and FIR used
AllConv and NSR used ResNet as the classifier. Note that
we also tried to include DefenseGAN but it failed to learn
properly on CIFAR10.
Both ϕDNNs surpass all others in all attacks for Table 3.
The result is expected since ϕDNNs do not only pre-process
images, they recreate them based on contextual information
and previous learned distribution.
4.2. NSR Analysis: When Losing Information is
Beneficial
NSR corrupts the input image possibly losing some infor-
mation. Here we will investigate if this loss of information
has any deleterious consequences. We will also analyze the
behavior of NSR on adversarial samples.
To analyze the influence of the initial input corruption by
δr(x), an ablation test is made, in which δr(x) is removed
from ϕr(x) (SR in Table 4).
Results show an increased robustness and similar accu-
racy. Specifically, in 8 out of 12 tests, the robustness of NSR
surpassed the ablated algorithm SR. Regarding the accuracy,
both NSR and SR performed similarly. NSR surpassed it in
half the tests and was surpassed in the other half.
These results reveal, perhaps counter-intuitively, that al-
ways adding noise (δr(x)) to the input is mostly beneficial
for neural networks that reconstruct their input. On aver-
age, it usually improves robustness while leaving accuracy
unchanged. There are two reasons for such a behavior: (a)
always adding noise constrains the image distribution to non-
smooth pixel transitions and (b) an always changing input is
harder to attack.
Figure 4 shows a sample behavior of ϕr. δr(x) corrupts
strongly x but SRGAN is able to recover most of it, result-
ing in a clean ϕr(x) image. Similar behavior happens to
adversarial sample x′. The difference between ϕr(x) and
ϕr(x
′) is substantially small and diluted compared to x and
x′ which reveals that ϕr worked well despite the negative
result.
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Table 1: Comparison between Feature Scattering (the current state-of-the-art defense) and the two proposed ϕDNNs with
adversarial training on CIFAR10 (NSRadv and FIRadv). Results show the attack accuracy over the defenses. For reference,
ϕDNNs without adversarial training (NSR and FIR), only ResNet with the same adversarial training used on NSRadv and
FIRadv (ResNetadv) and vanilla ResNet are also included.
Defense test acc 1px attack 10px attack
FGSM
( = 8)
PGD
( = 8)
Ours: NSRadv 0.827 0.074 0.086 0.089 0.087
Ours: FIRadv 0.885 0.028 0.038 0.046 0.126
FScattering 0.900 0.041 0.586 0.128 0.237
NSR 0.838 0.092 0.107 0.244 0.173
FIR 0.894 0.042 0.044 0.714 0.944
ResNetadv 0.892 0.200 0.838 0.718 1.000
ResNet 0.930 0.308 0.962 0.810 1.000
Table 2: Comparison between Feature Scattering (the current state-of-the-art defense) and the two proposed ϕDNNs with
adversarial training on SVHN (NSRadv and FIRadv). Results show the attack accuracy over the defenses. For reference,
ϕDNNs without adversarial training (NSR and FIR), only ResNet with the same adversarial training used on NSRadv and
FIRadv (ResNetadv) are also included.
Defense test acc 1px attack 10px attack
FGSM
( = 8)
PGD
( = 8)
Ours: NSRadv 0.924 0.011 0.041 0.080 0.060
Ours: FIRadv 0.930 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.012
FScattering 0.962 0.000 0.010 0.132 0.459
NSR 0.930 0.026 0.066 0.200 0.080
FIR 0.964 0.014 0.040 0.492 0.918
Figure 4: Behavior of an image sample x and its respective
adversarial sample x′ throughout ϕr(x).
4.3. FIR Analysis
In this section, FIR will be analyzed with relation to its
grid size, as well as its behavior for adversarial and original
samples. For L0 attacks (1px, 5px and 10px attacks), FIR
performs better with lower grid values while higher grid
values are better suited to L∞ attacks (PGD and FGSM)
(Table 5). This is expected since L0 attacks perturbs fewer
pixels and therefore punctual corrections are better. The
opposite is true for L∞. Figure 5 reveals that inpainting is
still limited in accuracy and therefore grids greater than one
have lower quality. Furthermore, an attack that modifies one
pixel at the border of a mask, might cause an even stronger
perturbation if the inpainting method uses that attacked pixel
as contextual information. This happened in Figure 5 for
the ϕi(x′) with the car and demonstrates the weakness of
bigger grids (or perhaps of current inpainting algorithms).
Attacking FIR is difficult because for a pixel to be modified
in the final image ϕi(x), many pixels around it must be
changed, in the case of lower grid values, or pixels near the
mask needs to be changed, in the case of higher grid values.
This creates a bigger burden on the attacker and causes many
attacks to fail. A simple version of adversarial training (with
FGSM created adversarial samples) improves substantially
the advantages of FIR, allowing it to even surpass the state-
of-the-art (Table 1).
5. Blind-spot as a Robustness Feature
Results with input reconstructing neural networks (ϕ
DNNs) revealed intriguing benefits of the δ(x) (i.e., of re-
moving parts or corrupting the input). In vertebrates, blind-
spot and the filling-in phenomena are analogous to respec-
tively the δ(x) and the input reconstruction process. Thus,
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Table 3: Comparison of proposed methods with other pre-prossessing based defenses. NSR and FIR models use the best
setting from Tables 4 and 5 while the other ones use AllConv and the best settings out of a couple of experiments.
Defense test acc 1px attack 10px attack
FGSM
( = 8)
PGD
( = 8)
Ours: NSR 0.838 0.092 0.107 0.244 0.173
Ours: FIR 0.894 0.042 0.044 0.714 0.944
FS 0.792 0.468 0.978 0.782 1.000
SS 0.786 0.132 0.522 0.744 0.988
JPEG 0.730 0.662 0.996 0.568 0.926
LS 0.914 0.370 0.954 0.448 1.000
Table 4: Attack accuracy for both NSR and SR (NSR without the added noise δr()) trained with different types of noise and
connected to ResNet. We tested Gaussian noise with 0 mean (µ), and variances (σ2) of 0.01. For Panda noise, the scalar
number (0.01) represents the probability (α and β) of white and black pixels present in the image. A+B represents that two
types of noises A and B are summed together. The subscript T means that the classifier was retrained with a data set made of
reconstructed images (i.e., images from ϕr(x)).
Defense Noise test acc 10px attack
FGSM
( = 8)
PGD
( = 8)
NSR +ResNet[Guassian0.01] 0.792 0.404 0.186 0.140
SR +ResNet[Gaussian0.01] 0.774 0.928 0.206 0.110
NSR +ResNet[Panda0.01] 0.910 0.290 0.222 0.262
SR +ResNet[Panda0.01] 0.915 0.212 0.724 0.880
NSR +ResNet[Guassian+Panda] 0.770 0.122 0.184 0.134
SR +ResNet[Guassian+Panda] 0.819 0.348 0.250 0.138
NSR +ResNet[Guassian+Panda]T 0.838 0.107 0.244 0.173
SR +ResNet[Guassian+Panda]T 0.805 0.836 0.220 0.136
Figure 5: Behavior of ϕi(x) on an image sample x and its
respective adversarial sample x′.
the results here suggest that blind-spot might improve ro-
bustness. It may also incentive, throughout evolution, in
the development of filling-in (input reconstruction), because
recreation of the input becomes a necessity. Moreover, once
filling-in is existent, it is expected that the blind-spot be-
comes mostly beneficial.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed perceptual deep learning net-
works which make use of corrupting functions and context-
based prediction and aggregation to reconstruct the input.
We showed that, perhaps surprisingly, corrupting the input
is beneficial to robustness. Moreover, similar to biological
neural networks, the input reconstruction, albeit different
from its initial one, has many advantages which includes
more control, constrained probabilities and unpredictability
from attacker’s perspective (i.e., now the attacker does not
know even the input).
Current results suggest that the proposed architecture is
robust to all types of attacks (e.g., no bias to L0 or L∞
was spotted), surpassing the state-of-the-art in adversarial
training and many other pre-processing based defenses. Hav-
ing said that, our exploration of the architecture was non-
exhaustive. We introduced only two implementations of
the ϕDNN’s architecture. There are certainly many more
powerful and interesting variations.
Last but not least, we conjecture that ϕDNNs use a primi-
tive type of imagination which can be further enhanced by
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Table 5: Comparing the difference of grid size on FIR’s accuracy and robustness. ResNet is the vanilla classifier while FIR+1 ,
FIR+4 and FIR
+
8 means using ResNet in the FIR’s architecture with grid size of respectively 1, 4 and 8. Each inpainting model
is trained with the corresponding grid size only, and the classifier model is trained with corresponding inpainting image from
ϕi(x).
Test accuracy 1px attack 10px attack
FGSM
( = 8)
PGD
( = 8)
ResNet 0.930 0.308 0.962 0.810 1.000
FIR1 0.894 0.042 0.044 0.714 0.944
FIR4 0.828 0.212 0.592 0.448 0.396
FIR8 0.749 0.298 0.656 0.370 0.276
not only improving GANs but by researching deeply into
the question regarding its foundation, i.e., what defines a
coherent perception?
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SUPPLEMENTARY WORK
This supplementary work includes noise descriptions,
additional experiments on other datasets and parameters;
and further examples of adversarial examples for ϕDNNs.
G. NOISE DESCRIPTION
Panda noise. Given a pixel g = (R, G, B) in a RGB image
I, Panda noise can be defined as follows:
f(g) =

g, P = 1− (α+ β)
(255, 255, 255), P = α
(0, 0, 0), P = β
where α and β are probabilities that a pixel in image I will
become respectively white or black.
ColorDepth noise. A RGB image represents feature infor-
mation by color bit depths. For example, CIFAR-10 encodes
images with 24-bit color depths. The ColorDepth noise re-
duces original images to fewer bits representation. Given a
normalized RGB image I that ranges from 0 to 1, and the
target t-bits color depths after reducing, this noise could be
formulated as:
I′ =
[I · (2t − 1)]
2t − 1
where [] denotes the standard rounding function and I′ is
the image encoded with t-bits color depths.
Gaussian noise. Given a RGB image I , the Gaussian
noise could be described as the following:
I′ = I +R ∼ N (µ, σ2)
where R is the Gaussian filter.
H. ADDITIONAL EXPERIMENTS
NSR and FIR performance remains mostly the same in
the SVHN dataset. Table 6 shows that even without adver-
sarial training the reconstruction of the input already possess
inherent robustness, similar to the results in CIFAR10.
Results in Table 7 reveals that NSR’s SRGAN trained
with Panda noise performs better on both black and white
box attacks when compared with it trained with Gaussian
noise. Moreover, the robustness is further improved when
we trained NSR with noise images consisting of half Panda
noise and half ColorDepth noise. This is expected since the
input image while testing always has the presence of noise,
i.e., the probability of input from both training and testing
gets closer to each other.
The results from table 8 demonstrate that there is no
significant improvement when NSR is combined with other
pre-processing methods such as FS and SS.
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Table 6: Attack accuracy for the two proposed ϕDNNs on SVHN.
Defense test acc 1px attack 10px attack
FGSM
( = 8)
PGD
( = 8)
NSR 0.930 0.026 0.066 0.200 0.080
FIR 0.964 0.014 0.018 0.492 0.918
Table 7: Effect of different noise types on the δr of NSR. The symbol 1/2 means that half of the training images had a certain
noise or clean images.
Noises 1px attack 10px attack
FGSM
(=2.55)
PGD
(=2.55)
NSR[1/2Gaussian+1/2Clean] 0.192 0.668 0.534 0.578
NSR[1/2Panda+1/2Clean] 0.080 0.256 0.446 0.428
NSR[1/2Panda+1/2ColorDepth] 0.058 0.182 0.292 0.286
I. TRAINING STRATEGY
We use Adam with learning scheduler in all experiments.
Due to the poor performance of Adam in the adversarial
training, the SGD with learning scheduler is used during
the adversarial training. To improve neural network perfor-
mance, we use learning scheduler to adjust learning rate. For
Adam learning scheduler, the learning rate starts from 10−3
and increases to 10−1 then decreases to 10−2, 10−3 and
0.5 ∗ 10−3. For SGD learning scheduler, the learning rate
starts from 10−1 and decreases to 10−2 and 10−3. To match
data normalization, we apply sigmoid activation function
instead of tanh as the last layer output for generator model
in SRGAN.
J. EXAMPLES OF IMAGES PROCESSED
BY ϕDNNs
Figure 6 to 9 contain some samples and the images from
each stage of the ϕrDNN when processing these samples.
Figure 10 follows a similar pattern but for ϕiDNN.
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Table 8: Comparison of the resulting attack accuracy for NSR with and without other pre-processing defenses.
Defenses 1px attack 10px attack
FGSM
(=2.55)
PGD
(=2.55)
NSR 0.072 0.158 0.178 0.210
NSR+FS 0.190 0.208 0.212 0.204
NSR+SS 0.160 0.204 0.320 0.274
Table 9: Attack accuracy for both NSR and SR (NSR without the added noise δr()) trained with different types of noise and
connected to AllConv and ResNet. We tested Gaussian noise with 0 mean (µ), and variances (σ2) of 0.01 and 0.001. For Panda
noise, the scalar number (0.01 and 0.05) represents the probability (α and β) of white and black pixels present in the image.
For ColorDepth noise, the scalar number 3 represents reduction of image color-bit to 3 bits. A+B represents that two types
of noises A and B are summed together while the A | B means it randomly generate either A or B with 50% probability each.
The subscript T means that the classifier was retrained with a data set made of reconstructed images (i.e., images from ϕr(x)).
Type Defense test acc 1px attack 10px attack
FGSM
( = 8)
PGD
( = 8)
N
SR
ResNet 0.930 0.308 0.962 0.810 1.000
ResNet[Guassian0.01] 0.792 0.136 0.404 0.186 0.140
ResNet[Guassian0.001] 0.892 0.218 0.670 0.554 0.456
ResNet[Panda0.01] 0.910 0.174 0.290 0.222 0.262
ResNet[Panda0.05] 0.897 0.726 0.724 0.706 0.446
ResNet[Guassian+Panda] 0.770 0.104 0.122 0.184 0.134
ResNet[Guassian+Panda]T 0.838 0.092 0.107 0.244 0.173
SR
ResNet[Gaussian0.01] 0.774 0.366 0.928 0.206 0.110
ResNet[Panda0.01] 0.915 0.040 0.212 0.724 0.880
ResNet[Panda|ColorDepth3] 0.898 0.078 0.288 0.582 0.438
ResNet[Guassian+Panda] 0.819 0.086 0.348 0.250 0.138
ResNet[Guassian+Panda]T 0.805 0.318 0.836 0.220 0.136
N
SR
AllConv 0.875 0.178 0.730 0.570 0.958
AllConv[Guassian+Panda] 0.772 0.076 0.120 0.248 0.540
AllConv[Guassian+Panda]T 0.798 0.078 0.102 0.282 0.442
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Figure 6: ϕr(x), ϕr(x′) and differences results 1.
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Figure 7: ϕr(x), ϕr(x′) and differences results 2.
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Figure 8: ϕr(x), ϕr(x′) and differences results 3.
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Figure 9: ϕr(x), ϕr(x′) and differences results 4.
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Figure 10: Example ϕi(x) on an image x and its respective adversarial sample x′ with Grid size 1, 4 and 8.
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